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1Sharq al-Adna: British Covert Radio and the 
Development of Arab Broadcasting
Sharq al-Adna, or the Near East Arab Broadcasting Station, was a covert 
British-controlled radio station, which broadcast in Arabic for ten hours a 
day from 1941  until its demise at the time of  the Suez crisis in 1956,  
when it was taken over by the military and became Sawt Al Britani-The 
Voice of Britain, a much-derided attempt by the authorities to counter 
Egypt’s Radio Cairo (Franzen 2009). 
It was begun by the Special Operations Executive, or SOE in Jenin in 
Palestine in 1941, later moving to Jaffa, where in 1943 it came under the 
control of the Political Warfare Executive, (PWE) then Jerusalem in 1947 
and finally in 1948 to Cyprus where it continued on the surface as a 
commercial station but was in reality still controlled by the British 
intelligence services and funded through a mixture of secret British 
government subsidy, advertising and oil company money. It had a largely 
Arab staff, drawn from across the region, with a small number of British 
officers operating in the background.  Throughout its career it had to 
adapt to the changing nature both of the objectives of its creators and the 
social and political environment in which it operated at the same time as 
masking its true identity. Begun in order to counter Italian and German 
propaganda efforts, the station broadcast a mixture of popular music, 
2plays, topical discussions and readings from the Koran, alongside  news 
programmes which were attuned to Arab sensibilities at the same time as 
following a pro-British agenda so subtle as to be near undetectable. This 
policy continued into the early years of the cold war but finally foundered  
when tensions with Egypt made this sleight of hand impossible. This 
article will argue that by its very nature the success or otherwise of the 
propaganda effort of Sharq Al-Adna was at the time, and remains difficult 
to assess but the choices made by its founders as to content and staffing 
mean that its most concrete contribution was to the development of Arab 
broadcasting and the cultural life of the region. 
‘Secret’ entities, such as Sharq al-Adna are not easy to research and what 
has been written about the station has been hampered by contemporary 
obfuscation of governments and their officials, by the rules surrounding 
the release of state papers and the continuing sensitivity of some aspects 
of the story. The picture has been getting fuller the further away we are 
from the events, however. Much of the literature on Sharq al-Adna, has 
concentrated on the climactic events of 1956, for example (Rawnsley 
1996) and (Boyd 2003) and less on the station’s early history. Sharq has 
featured more extensively (Vaughan 2005) as part of an assessment of 
the overall propaganda effort of both the British and the Americans in the 
region from the end of WW2 to the immediate aftermath of Suez, 
concentrating on the match, or more accurately mismatch between policy 
and propaganda. This article is based upon published academic work, 
government papers as they have been released, the memoirs, published 
3and unpublished of some of those involved, including, unusually for an 
article on this subject in English, some material originally published in 
Arabic1. In so doing it seeks to go beyond the discussion of purely 
Western-focused foreign policy objectives and strategies within which the 
literature on the station is usually framed and looks to make a 
contribution to the history of culture and the media in the region.  This is 
an area which it has been argued (Armbrust 2012) that is both under-
researched in general and has lacunae in what writing there is when it 
comes, for example to early radio and religion, or entertainment, both of 
which featured in broadcasting at the time but have been largely ignored 
by the academy in favour of news.    This article then offers, an analysis of 
the nature of British ‘Information work’ (as it was called) in the Middle 
East during WW2 and into the Cold War, highlighting the sometimes-
divided loyalties of those involved and offers an insight into the 
beginnings of broadcasting in the Arab world. 
Sharq al-Adna was neither the first nor the only British attempt at 
broadcasting to the Middle East in the Arabic language in the nineteen 
thirties. Nor was it the first external broadcaster to the region; this was 
Italy’s Radio Bari, which began broadcasting in Arabic in March 1934. 
Others followed, as European nations began broadcasting ‘to their own 
colonial and mandate outposts’ (Stanton 2006). In the case of Radio Bari, 
1 For Translations from the Arabic, I am indebted to University of 
Westminster colleagues Dr Noura Al-Obeidli and Mahmoud Zaki
4they also broadcast to the possessions of other colonial powers, to the 
increasing consternation of their rulers. Radio Bari soon became popular 
in the region, broadcasting to Italian-controlled Libya but also to ‘Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine and the Red Sea region’. The Italians supplied 
cheap sets to aid popularity and by 1935 it was reported Radio Bari could 
be heard in cafes across Palestine, where the clientele ‘sipped their coffee 
and swallowed Italian propaganda with every mouthful’ (MacDonald 1977: 
195) In response, the British Mandate authorities launched the Palestine 
Broadcasting Service from the end of March 1936, broadcasting in Arabic, 
Hebrew and English. This was followed by the BBC External Services, 
which began an Arabic Service in January 1938.  Other languages were 
soon added and by the eve of WW2, the BBC was broadcasting to the 
Middle East and the Balkans in eight languages including English 
(Vaughan, 2008). Not to be outdone, the Germans began short wave 
broadcasts to the Middle East from the autumn of 1939.
Sharq al-Adna was then only one actor in a crowded scene of external 
broadcasting to the Middle East but unlike the other stations mentioned 
above, it was a covert operation, which sought to hide who ultimately 
controlled it in a way that Radio Bari, or the broadcasts from Berlin did 
not. They were broadcast in the Italian and German interest from Italy and 
Germany respectively. 
5The SOE, disbanded at the end of the war, was set up by the British in 
1940 to conduct sabotage operations principally in enemy-occupied 
territory. It also had a propaganda arm, SO1, under whose auspices Sharq 
was created. Although it was the mid 1980s before official papers on SOE 
activities were released, (and some have yet to be made public), the 
temporary nature of the SOE has allowed numerous of its wartime 
operatives to write memoirs, which though partial as these things 
inevitably are have provided detail on the station, its broadcasts and the 
people who created it. Known by some as the Baker Street Irregulars, 
after the location of their London headquarters and with a nod to Sherlock 
Holmes.2 
Broadcasting was but part of a much wider SOE-controlled propaganda 
effort. SO1 was headed by Rex Leeper, who was to later to be credited 
with founding the British Council. In the autumn of 1941, he laid out in a 
memo his thoughts on news, propaganda and political warfare. The 
current war was the first where such a technique had been employed he 
wrote, using the two new communication technologies of the interwar 
period, radio and talking pictures. ‘These two weapons brought politics 
straight to the masses’.3 The means to be employed were listed in another 
memo the following April, namely, ‘broadcasting; the clandestine 
2 Location was it seems a common nickname for parts of the British intelligence setup. 
Aficionados of the spy novels of John Le Carre, will be familiar with the ‘Circus’, or MI6, so 
named after its location in Cambridge Circus in the West End of London. The secret 
political vetting of BBC employees by MI5, finally exposed in the mid 1980s, was called 
‘colleging’ by those in on the process, as the papers of employees to be investigated 
were sent over to Bedford College, that organisation’s headquarters until it was bombed 
by the Germans and had to move elsewhere. The name persisted.
3 TNA FO 954/23/A ‘The Meaning of Political Warfare’, Rex Leeper 15 October 1941
6circulation of printed material; and oral propaganda in the form of 
rumours’. The broadcasting section comprised two entities, a collection of 
‘black’ radio transmissions in various European languages run from 
Jerusalem, and Sharq al-Adna from Jaffa. Information officers across the 
region distributed material produced in Cairo and fostered their own 
networks of contacts. Central to this effort and especially relevant to 
Sharq al-Adna in particular was that it was ‘an absolute principle of all 
propaganda conducted by SOE that it shall not appear to emanate from 
any British source… For this purpose, SOE propaganda…must be able, if 
necessary to differ from the official policy of HMG’. [my italics] This of 
course related to the credibility of the material but crucially in the case of 
Sharq it also allowed the British government to distance itself from the 
broadcast contents where they were politically sensitive. 4
Sharq was founded at a time in the summer of 1941 when there were real 
fears that Cairo might fall to the forces of Germany and Italy, Palestine 
itself was threatened and in the words of Conservative, MP, SS 
Hammerley, quoted by John Connell Robertson, (who was to achieve post 
war fame as an author and broadcaster under the name John Connell, and 
whose own published memoirs are also a source for this article), ‘every 
Arab in the Middle East thought we [the British] were done for’(Connell 
1947: 8-9).
4 TNA FO 898/113 SOE Activities 1941-2 Memo, ‘Middle East and Balkans. Activities of 
Directorate of Special Propaganda’ from Lord Glenconner 10 April 1942
7According to Ewan Butler, who ran the Jerusalem ‘black’ stations aimed at 
the Balkans, it occurred to ‘some far-sighted planner…’ that  ‘it might be 
an advantage for us to control a radio station which already enjoyed the 
confidence and even, perhaps, in some degree, the affection of the 
Arabs’. Once established, ‘if the worst came to the worst’ it could be run 
‘from the Sudan or even Kenya’ and used as a vehicle to encourage 
resistance to the Nazis (Butler 1963: 52). 
Personnel and Programmes
The ‘far sighted planner’, was Air Commodore Kenneth Carron Buss, who 
‘had served many years in the Middle East: he spoke beautiful Arabic: he 
knew and loved Arabs’ (Connell 1947: 69). He was also a convert to Islam. 
In Connell’s telling, Buss proposed the station to him as something akin to 
a gift: ‘We ought to get a radio station going for the Arabs. Their radio 
station; putting out their broadcasts’ (Connell 1947: 81). Knowing nothing 
of broadcasting and but five words of Arabic himself, he was not, however, 
without resources. In addition to the local knowledge acquired by long-
serving officers such as Buss, the SOE had a wide range of talent to draw 
on, including senior academics from prestigious British universities.  One 
such, orientalist Dr J Hayworth-Dunne, had been given leave of absence 
from SOAS and tasked to ‘cover everything connected with Islam, the 
Arabic language and subversive movements in Islamic countries directed 
or organised against Great Britain’. In the spring of 1941 he was 
responsible for: the production of propaganda pamphlets and the like; the 
8organisation of societies to spread pro-British thought and the attempted  
break up of their pro-German and Italian counterparts; and the sending of 
agents to infiltrate mosques to spread his ‘whispers’, his term for the 
rumours mentioned above. He excoriated British efforts at broadcasting, 
the BBC lacked ‘any punch or appeal’ whereas the locals loved ‘to listen to 
the vitriolic outpourings’ emanating from Berlin, which were of ‘unlimited 
danger’ and he thought should either be jammed or listening to them 
declared illegal.5  
Personnel for the new station, both British and Arab were chosen with 
some care—the British, Buss being a case in point, because they had 
knowledge of and in some cases a demonstrable identification with the 
region, its people and their culture; the Arabs, au contraire often because 
they had publicly opposed the British presence. Heyworth-Dunne had 
been referring to the broadcasts of Sheikh Haj Amin Husseini, ex Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem, then resident in Berlin. Haj Amin had at one time been 
favoured by the British authorities early in the Mandate but had 
eventually been forced to flee to Iraq and from there to Germany. The 
Middle East, and Palestine in particular looked like fertile ground for Axis 
propagandists. British responses to the Arab rebellion of 1936-9 were 
characterised by widespread brutality, (Hughes 2010) the imprisonment of 
some of the most respected Arab leaders and the suspension and closure 
of Arab newspapers. The Germans were also, at this stage, winning 
5 TNA FO 898/113 Propaganda and Intelligence work carried out by Dr J Heyworth-Dunne 
for the Arab-Moslem area of the middle east command during March-May 1941
9militarily – but the station launched on the cusp of change. By the 
autumn, the Germans were locked into the fight with the Russians, which 
would prove their undoing. Popular opinion may have been to the contrary 
but the British were not finished and though Husseini may have been a 
thorn in their side, even this could be turned to advantage. 
When it was suggested that it was essential that the Director of 
Programmes for the new station should be an Arab, one of the Grand 
Mufti’s relatives, Dr Ishaq Husseini was chosen. He taught at the Arabic 
College in Jerusalem and had studied journalism in Cairo and literature in 
SOAS in London, and was to become one of the leading literary figures in 
Palestine. His credentials then, as to education, pedigree, and politics, 
both by his family ties with Haj Amin and (Butler 1963) by his own 
writings, were highly appealing. As Connell put it, ‘he was we were 
mysteriously assured, highly suspect; we checked that, and his record was 
impeccable’ (Connell 1947: 104).  Other, similar appointments were to 
follow.  Another politically significant figure, Sheikh Abdul Kadir Al 
Muzaffar, was to deliver topical commentaries for the station.  He had long 
been regarded by the Mandate authorities as ‘a notorious agitator and 
firebrand’ and ‘one of the most dangerous men in Palestine’ (Ghandour 
2010: 133). Muzzafar had been imprisoned several times by the British, 
during the ‘troubles’ but at the outbreak of war had volunteered his 
services to the British and when he heard about Sharq, he did the same. It 
was an offer which was eagerly accepted.  Given the objectives of those 
founding the station the advantage was clear, it was ‘a guarantee of the 
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authentically Arab character of the station. It was surely inconceivable 
that the British would have ever allowed him on the air’ (Butler 1963: 59).  
One might speculate on what was in it for the Sheikh? To Butler it was a 
straightforward, pragmatic choice and when Muzaffar had offered his 
services in 1939 he did it ‘on the clear understanding that as soon as the 
Germans were soundly beaten he would resume his activities against the 
British. For Sheikh Muzaffar, the matter was simply a choice of evils, and 
the British were the lesser of two evils’ (Butler 1963: 58-59). 
Wing Commander Alfred Marsack, (known also as Shams Al Din Al Hajj) 
the station’s first director was, like Buss, for whom he had worked, fluent 
in Arabic, having served in the region in the inter-war years. Like Buss, he 
too had converted to Islam. He announced the launch of the station in 
Arabic. Sharq al-Adna was to be ‘From Arabs to Arabs only, and I’m the 
only foreigner to work in it. Other than that, the Arab staff manages the 
radio entirely… We want to reflect Islamic principles and Arabic heritage, 
and broadcast news, entertainment programmes, and music (Mansour 
2017)’. 
A great deal of his value to Sharq was his deep and intimate engagement 
with the region and its people. His second in command, Major GE Law in 
his unpublished memoirs wrote,
he had not confined himself to adopting the faith. With it, he had taken 
over some distinct tinge of the Arab mentality and way of life. He was 
genuinely more at ease with Arabs than with his own countrymen–a 
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fact which makes service under him a trifle disconcerting for an 
Englishman.6
He knew personally many of the leading figures in the Arab world. 
Marsack refused to patronise the Jaffa Club, favoured by British officers for 
food drinks and bathing, because it did not allow Arabs to become 
members, ‘and this ran contrary to all his ideas and predilections’ and Law 
was forced to use the distinctly inferior Arab facilities along with his boss. 
Politically, Marsack identified with Arab aspirations and shared their 
opposition to Jewish immigration, which ‘he regarded as gross 
infringements of the rights of the Arabs and the miserable negation of all 
the promises made to King Faisal and his family’.7
By the time Law arrived, Sharq was firmly established, with himself and 
Marsack as the only two British officers involved and with an Arab staff of 
one hundred and twenty drawn from across the region, some with 
broadcasting experience on loan from the Egyptian Broadcasting 
Corporation and ‘Sharq al-Adna rapidly got a reputation for slick and effective 
programmes’ (Partner 1988: 53). The station broadcast ten hours a day on a 
transmitter powerful enough to be heard eventually from Aleppo in the 
north to Asmara and Khartoum in the south, from Tehran in the east to 
Cyrenaica and Tripoli in  the west. Following the example of Radio Bari, 
the content was mainly entertainment. As well as a large library of Arabic 
6 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943
7 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943
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recordings, Sharq had two station orchestras: one, the  Near East Radio 
Ensemble founded by Abdul Karim Bader, maestro of the oud, when he 
worked on the station in the early nineteen forties. Famous musicians and 
singers such as Mary Jubran, ‘the nightingale of the Lebanon’ and Laure 
George Dakkash were engaged to stay for short periods to perform, as 
well as the band of the Arab Legion from Amman in Transjordan. In the 
1950s, recordings of Fayrouz, perhaps the most famous singer of all, 
introduced her to the wider Arab public. She and the Rahbani brothers 
were given a contract in 1953, ‘There, the Rahbani brothers had time to 
experiment and they had a studio and an orchestra’ (Burkhalter 2013: 
155). Kamel Qustandi, who was eventually to run the station’s commercial 
side after it moved to Cyprus was interviewed in 1998 on his time at the 
station. He, like many other young Palestinians found employment with 
the British military, at first in his case as a watchman at a military base 
but was then recruited to the music section of Sharq and from there, 
having shown a short story he had written to the station manager 
Muhammed Al Ghussain, he became head of drama. He credits the station 
with a significant role in the cultural life of the region, popularising the 
music of such stars as Mohamed Abdel Wahab (who went on to write the 
national anthems of both Libya and Tunisia) and Egyptian singer Um 
Kulthum. Recordings made in the 1950s by the station’s field team, who 
travelled the region was later distributed to other radio networks.  In this 
he is in agreement with GE Law, who was of the opinion that, its political 
significance aside, Sharq provided ‘an opportunity for spreading  
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entertainment and education to their peoples on a quite unheard of scale’, 
which to him alone justified its existence.8 
Sharq personnel went on to work, and in some cases to found radio 
stations across the region, using knowledge and skills obtained while 
working at the station. In 1948 EH Paxton of the BBC made a tour of the 
region, concerned principally with how the BBC was received but he also 
reported on other broadcasters.  He expressed a very low opinion of the 
professionalism of Radio Lebanon, for example comparing it unfavourably 
with the Sharq Beirut operation. ‘Radio Damascus, in sharp contrast…is in 
charge of an intelligent young man who worked with Sharq al-Adna in the 
early days…was full of bright ideas. He is very keen on educating the 
masses…’9  Radio Lebanon, founded in 1936 had been taken over by the 
Lebanese government in 1946, shortly before Paxton’s tour and later one 
might see the influence of Sharq personnel at work in the following,  ‘In 
1950, Halim al-Rumi became director of its music department. Working 
with similar ideas as al-Sharq al-Adna, he offered contracts to musicians 
and composers. Soon, the radio station had its own orchestra’ (Burkhalter 
2013: 155). To Nicola Ziada, who worked on the station, Sharq ‘was a 
radio broadcasting school’, whose employees went on to influence the 
development of most Arab radio networks. The Zionist-supporting 
Palestine Post, which was not always enamoured of the contents of Sharq 
broadcasts, noted the departure of Marsack for a position with BBC in 
8 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943, p93
9 TNA, FO 371/81983 EH Paxton Report on Middle East Tour, November-December 1949, 
p9
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September 1944 saying that ‘He supplied the academic and artistic needs 
of this part of the Arab world by programmes of a wide range’… thus 
building up ‘much goodwill’ (Palestine Post 14 September 1944: 4). 
It was not all entertainment. Talks on a wide variety of subjects, chosen 
by the Arab programme directors with little or no interference from the 
British officers were a regular feature. Azmi Al Nashashibi, from another of 
Palestine’s leading families gave a series of talks in 1941-2, aimed at 
enhancing Arab-British relations partly based on his own experiences of 
life as a student in London. The Palestine Post announced in the autumn 
of 1944 that Amina Said, the Egyptian feminist had arrived in Palestine 
and was to give a series of talks on Sharq (30 October 1944: 2).  Ziada 
was anchor 1947-8 of  ‘Cambridge University Calling the Arabs’ 
interviewing visiting academics from a wide variety of disciplines (Ziada 
2003).
From the start, readings from the Koran ‘were a vital part of the daily 
programme’. In Cairo, Heyworth Dunne had advised that one essential for 
the station was a Koran chanter and they secured at no little expense and 
difficulty ‘the services of the finest, but the finest Koran chanter in Egypt’ 
(Connell 1947: 105). He was flown up to Jenin and the station went on air 
on the next day, the first of Ramadan 1941 with a long recital of the Koran 
(Connell 1947: 109). Subsequently, they regularly used three blind 
chanters, ‘considered by the cognoscenti to be to be workmanlike 
performers’, but on special occasions, such as during Ramadan, they 
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looked further afield. This did not come cheap and Law was astonished 
when he discovered the amount, £120.00, (roughly £6,500 today) being 
paid per month to one such from Cairo, ‘plus all his hotel, travelling and 
living expenses’.10 The station could afford it. Most contributors were no 
doubt very pleased with the fees on offer but it did arouse the suspicions 
of some. The station at one point invited Egyptian literary giant Taha 
Hussein to give a series of talks. EH Paxton, of the BBC, interviewed him 
some years’ later. Hussein was curious as to the precise nature of the 
station and said, ‘The terms offered were so fantastically generous, 
including first-class travel and accommodation to his family, that he 
rejected the offer. He thought there must be a catch in it’11. 
The catch, was of course in the news programmes. The vast bulk of the 
output was indeed by, of and for, Arabs. The news was something else. As 
Palestinian historian Nasri Al Jawzi has written, ‘There was a complete and 
sharp separation between the production of programmes on the one hand 
and the production of news reports on the other…news reports, which 
were originally delivered in English and translated into Arabic by two 
editors, Bassam Azar and Nimer Shehab’. 
News came from a variety of sources, from Britain and from local 
correspondents stationed around the region and ‘there was an unwritten 
agreement that the two Arabic editors would draw the English official’s 
10 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943, 
p147
11 TNA, FO 371/81983 EH Paxton Report on Middle East Tour, November-December 1949. 
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attention to news contents that were considered harmful and offensive 
[from a political perspective] to broadcast for its Arab audience. This 
mechanism remained valid until the Suez Canal crisis of 1956…(Al Jawzi Al 
Maqdisi 2010)’.
To keep knowledge of British involvement in the station to a minimum, the 
news had to balance British policy and Arab predilections and aspirations. 
During the war, ‘There was plenty of anti-Nazi and antifascist in them, but 
no waving of the Union Jack’12 and there were compromises even in 
countering the opposition; Law wrote that he and one of the Arab staff, 
Yusuf Bandak, (whose journalist father Issa Bandak had been imprisoned 
by the British during the ‘troubles’), produced a five minute, ‘Answering 
Today’s Axis Lies’ feature, but Law chose to ignore the Belin broadcasts of 
Haj Amin, 
I thought it unwise, and probably dangerous, to attempt to answer his 
broadcasts. It seemed to me more prudent, if faint-hearted, to leave 
them severely alone. How could I venture to challenge a man in debate 
who was speaking to his own people, in his own tongue, and had been 
a leading figure in all the controversy of which I knew so little?13
12 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943, 
p91-2
13 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943, 
p140
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It was not only the desire to minimise the British profile of the station that 
determined the news agenda: the leeway offered by its covert status and 
its mission to persuade the Arabs to identify with Britain rather than the 
Germans and Italians was one factor; the sensibilities of the Arab staff was 
another. It was tactically wise to place the station in the charge of an 
officer of proven Arab sympathies (as were his successors,) and a staff of 
proven rebelliousness. The credibility this afforded the station with the 
Arab public did come with a price, however. To be an authentically ‘Arab’ 
station it had to voice Arab political views and suppress or at least 
disguise British ones not least because the staff would expect one and not 
tolerate the other. This was well understood by the British officers working 
on the station. GE Law, writing of the beginnings of the station accurately 
predicted the actions of the Arab staff at the end, 
As you will see any British slant to the programmes was conspicuous 
by its absence. And I am quite certain that most of the staff would 
never have leant themselves to be a mere mouthpiece of British 
propaganda. They were extremely proud of having their own Arab 
station and they looked upon it as specifically their own.14  
Changing times, changing role
14 IWM Documents 4547, Private Papers Major GE Law, Memoirs Dec 1941-Sept 1943, 
Summary, p2
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As the war in Europe ended in 1945, the security situation in Palestine 
deteriorated and travel around the country became increasingly difficult 
for British military personnel and Arab staff alike. Early in its career the 
station had moved from Jenin to better premises in Jaffa but by 1947 Jaffa 
was no longer safe and Sharq being both British and Arab was a target for 
the Zionist underground and was forced to relocate to the Bab el Zahiri 
quarter of Jerusalem, where it occupied ‘a bleak little compound’ where 
the occupants were holed up for weeks on end (Hodgkin 2012: 309). 
Operating difficulties informed a review in the form of a series of 
questions sent round to British missions in the region on the station’s 
continued ‘value and usefulness’ in the summer of 1947, by which time 
Sharq had Colonel Edward C Hodgkin as its third Director. They reported 
favourably, ‘and that the popularity of the station is in most cases at least 
equal to, if not exceeding that of the BBC’. 
Particularly appealing was the entertainment but also the local items. The 
station also fed newspapers around the region and in response to this 
demand had recently started a news broadcast at dictation speed. The 
Amman station compared it to its nearest rival the Palestine Broadcasting 
Service, which was viewed as having a Jewish bias, whereas Sharq 
‘represents Arab opinion fairly’. From Cairo, a comment on the continued 
absence of ‘flag-waving’, 
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The fact that while Sharq el Adna is generally recognised as a British-
sponsored station, its programmes are oriented in such a way as to 
maintain Arab goodwill. (Those few Arabs who think about such things 
are puzzled as to the real policy of Sharq el Adna, since, broadly 
speaking, the station cannot be charged with any objectionable 
grinding of the British axe and is usually careful to present the Arab 
viewpoint in an acceptable light).
As well as information on Sharq’s popularity with the public, respondents 
had also been asked for suggestions as to improvements and again from 
Cairo, ‘that Sharq might devote more time to British publicity work in the 
Middle East’, ie, that a propaganda station should broadcast some 
propaganda! However, and this is the crux of the dilemma facing the 
station, any such material ‘would need very careful handling since any 
noticeable move in this direction might easily result in a falling-off in the 
station’s popularity’.15 
Eventually, shortly before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 
the station was forced to move once more to Limassol, as ‘one of the 
British military units  to come to Cyprus from Palestine’,(Palestine Post 3 
April 1950: 2) where, once established, it was but part of ‘a huge 
propaganda apparatus in the Middle East following the end of the war’, 
having at the time the most powerful medium wave transmitter in the 
15 TNA FO 953/60 PME1421 Middle East Information Department, replies from Information 
Officers, July 1947 
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region, and run since its move to Cyprus by MI6 (Franzen 2009: 752). As 
the Cold War developed, its preoccupations came to the fore, and ‘a good 
deal of time and effort was expended by Western propagandists, such as 
the Information Research Department (IRD) of the British Foreign Office in 
attempting to get their major themes carried by Arabic broadcasting 
stations’. British-run stations like Sharq, along with the BBC were favoured 
outlets. For example ‘In late January and mid-February 1955, Sharq 
broadcast,  ‘11 talks containing anti-Communist angles and 5 of a directly 
anti-communist nature’(Vaughan 2004: 62). Islam, which had been a 
prominent feature on the station from the start, was also a major plank of 
the propaganda effort of the IRD. It was seen as a bulwark against 
communism and ‘the IRD continued energetically to propagate belief in 
the fundamental incompatibility of communism and Islam’, going so far in 
Egypt as to produce sermons for distribution to Imams (Vaughan 2004: 
64-5).   
Central to what James Vaughan sees as the failure of British and American 
propaganda efforts in the region, was the Arab-Israel dispute and ‘the 
pernicious influence of the conflict was felt in almost every branch of the 
information and cultural diplomacy programmes in the region’. Britain and 
the US did not always agree on policy towards first partition and then 
recognition of the state of Israel and part of the British propaganda effort 
including Sharq, was aimed at distancing Britain from the policies of US 
President Truman. Because of its stance on Palestine, Sharq was accused 
of broadcasting anti-Jewish and after 1948, anti-Israeli material, leading to 
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allegations  that the Foreign Secretary was using Sharq ‘as a sly agent of 
ours which can say what Mr Bevin is afraid to say openly and get away 
with’ (Vaughan 2005: 128-38).
 
The early nineteen fifties also saw relations with Egypt under strain, at 
first over the number of British troops stationed in the country, then over 
Sudan, then of course over the Suez Canal. A ‘secret’ memorandum from 
April 1952 commented on the role of ‘information work’ in the region. ‘Our 
task’ it read, referring to the previous winter’s confrontation with the 
Egyptian government which involved the mass mobilisation of British 
troops ‘was primarily to ensure that in an area where public opinion must 
be expected to be emotionally on the side of the Egyptians’, what the 
writer opined was a ‘true version of the facts’ should be made known and 
the case made for a continuing British military presence. In this regard 
‘Our most effective weapon was undoubtedly broadcasting. The BBC, with 
its reputation for accurate news reporting, broadcasts in Arabic for three 
hours a day at key listening times, and our clandestine station at Cyprus 
broadcasts a full day’s programme in Arabic’. 
Both were widely listened to and were used as a source of news by Arab 
newspaper editors. Looking forward, it went on, 
it would appear that in any future crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations the 
Middle East states other than Egypt are a better propaganda target 
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than the Egyptians themselves. This is because the other Arab states 
are a softer target and more susceptible to the arguments which we 
are able to put forward, whereas the Egyptians are at the mercy of 
their own Ministers, press and radio. 
Their work should be ‘aiming at detaching other Arab sympathies from 
Egypt’.16 
Finance and control   
The precise identity of who or what body financed and ultimately 
controlled Sharq al-Adna both before and after it moved to Cyprus has 
been difficult to determine. Much has been suspected, but little known for 
sure. Most of the audience, who would have had various levels of 
understanding of or interest in its provenance would have simply listened 
to its programmes. The official response to those who were interested was 
always at the very least equivocal. Quizzed in parliament in 1948 over 
broadcasts in support of armed action by the Arab countries in Palestine, 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin denied the station was run by the Foreign 
Office and said ‘It is operated by a body of people connected with the 
Arabs’ and that ‘The people who have been operating it are the same 
16 TNA FO 953/1230 Memorandum Note on Information Work in the Middle East April 15 
1952 CFR Barclay, Information Policy Department
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people who operated it for years in Palestine’(Hansard 16 June 1948) .17 
Asked similar questions two years later, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, John Dugdale, said Sharq was run by ‘a private company 
registered in Cyprus, its main object being to promote the exchange of 
cultural and general information throughout the Near East’.18 
 
The Palestine Post had announced in April 1950 (3 April 1950: 3), that the 
station had been taken over by a private company, the Near East 
Association, under the chairmanship of Sir Harold MacMichael, former 
High Commissioner in Palestine, but it was registered not in the UK but 
in Cyprus. Even that is in some doubt, as ‘Sharq al-Adna had never been 
officially identified as a commercial station at all; it was omitted, for 
example, from the list of commercial broadcasting stations in the 
colonies produced by the Colonial Office for the Beveridge Broadcasting 
Report of 1949’ (Rawnsley 1996: 502). 
What has also not been clear, is precisely when the station began taking 
advertising and so became the ‘commercial’ station it was supposed to 
be. It arrived in Limassol as a military operation in 1948 and at some point 
made the transition. Kamel Qustandi, interviewed in 2015 at the age of 
89, said this was in 1953, at the suggestion of the Arab staff and he went 
to London the following year to deal directly with British advertisers (Al 
Jawzi Al Maqdisi 2010). Subsequent releases of government papers have 
17 Hansard, Oral Answers Radio Station, Cyprus (Propaganda) Mr Bevin to various 
questions 16 June 1948
18 Hansard, Question Mr Parker to Mr Dugdale 10 May 1950 P 1044/6
24
thrown additional light on the matter. A November 1956 Cabinet briefing 
note following the requisitioning of Sharq al-Adna, makes plain who paid 
for the station and how much. The Palestine Post in announcing the take-
over of the station by the NEA in 1950 had said that at that time it had 
been financed by the Foreign Office to the tune of £10,000 per annum. 
The briefing note shows this to be a wild underestimate. It opened, ‘The 
Near East Arab Broadcasting Station, or Sharq-al-Adna in Cyprus is owned 
by a private company secretly controlled by Her Majesty’s 
Government…Its Directors and senior staff are British, but the majority of 
the staff are Arabs’.  It continued, with a revelation which has not surfaced 
before about the precise sources of its funding, ‘Before requisitioning the 
station it cost about £400,000 a year to run. It derived about £60,000 a 
year from advertising revenue and a further £75,000 as a special 
contribution from the oil companies.[my italics] The remainder was 
provided from the Secret Vote’. 
This was lavish funding – at the same time the BBC External Services for 
the Middle East cost £141,000 per annum for broadcasting 38 ½ hours per 
week. So Sharq could well afford the sums paid to contributors. 
Continuation in some form and with a similar mix of funding, from oil and 
other companies and government, was desirable. The new station would 
address ‘the uneducated masses’ while the BBC continued to broadcast to 
‘the educated and influential listeners’.  Government funding would have 
to be from the Open, rather than the Secret Vote, though (the secret vote 
or secret service vote was the sum allocated by parliament each year to 
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the intelligence services). The advertising the station carried was a 
valuable contribution financially as well as for bolstering the station’s 
‘legend’19 and was considered to have increased exports to the region by 
some £3,500,000 in the previous year and former clients were enquiring 
when it would be restarted. To ensure the future viability of the 
replacement for Sharq it might be necessary for HMG ‘to purchase the 
station from its present ostensible owners’ and perhaps to lease it to the 
new ones, but careful consideration would be necessary both in looking 
forward and ‘including preservation of cover for Her Majesty’s 
Government’s interest in the previous set up’.20  
Denouement
Increasing tension between Britain and Egypt and concomitant pressure 
on Sharq to increase its anti-Egyptian content put its credibility as an 
independent entity under increasing strain, but in the autumn of 1955, it 
was still felt to be the best vehicle available to explain the benefits to local 
populations of the British presence in the region. By the following year this 
was no longer plausible and Sharq was being denounced, in Egypt at least 
‘as a dangerous imperialist agitator’. This was recognised in London. In a 
September 1956 discussion of plans to commandeer the station noted 
that ‘Sharq on its present basis is becoming rather embarrassing, as many 
people now suspect the station to be controlled by HM Government’. 
19 Term for cover for an agent. The false story or biography behand an assumed identity. 
20 TNA PREM 11/1149 Middle East (Policy) Briefing note for the Ministerial Committee on 
Overseas Broadcasting, by AD Dodds-Parker, Parliamentary Under-Secreary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, November 20, 1956
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Another went, ‘I exclude the possibility of any rehabilitation of Sharq in its 
present form. Effectively Sharq has been “blown”’.21 
And so to the tripartite attack on Egypt. Communication featured 
prominently in military preparations. According to Brigadier Bernard 
Ferguson, Director of Psychological Warfare, in the original plan, ‘the very 
first stick of bombs’ on the 31st October, would target Radio Cairo, and 
Sharq al-Adna would be commandeered to replace it immediately, 
(Ferguson 1970: 265). In the end, Radio Cairo was reprieved for a few 
days, but Sharq was commandeered. As foreseen, this was to prove no 
simple matter. The question of the loyalty of the Arab staff was key. A 
Foreign Office minute in September noted, ‘As I understand it, one of the 
main difficulties about using Sharq to put over the British point of view in 
a big way is that the Arab staff are likely to desert if this is done’. 22  
Ferguson had tried and failed to recruit Arabic speakers against this 
possibility: Egyptians feared repercussions for their families in Egypt and 
approaches to the BBC drew a blank. Roy Poston, the then Director of 
Sharq al-Adna, was told ‘in veiled terms’ what was being planned. 
Poston’s reaction was not ideal: ‘His sympathies were deeply and 
genuinely with the Egyptians and he was distressed at the very thought of 
it’. Poston assured him, echoing Law’s words from 1941, ‘that none of his 
21 TNA FO 1110/947 Middle East, Broadcasting to the Middle East, Unsigned, undated 
(but September 1956 because of its position in the file)
22 TNA FO 1110/947 Middle East, Broadcasting to the Middle East, minute P Dean to Mr 
Rennie, 26 September 1956 
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Arab or British staff [my italics] would agree to broadcast our bulletins or 
propaganda’(Ferguson 1970: 267). 
And so it proved. The station was commandeered and one of the staff, 
Massara Khoury, ‘who was in tears’ was at some point forced ‘to 
broadcast live news reports against Egypt and the Arabs’(Al Jawzi Al 
Maqdisi  2010). The following night, the staff put out another message 
repeated in English and Arabic all through the night of the 31st 
October/1st November, saying ‘the staff of Sharq Al-Adna was heart and 
soul with their Arab brethren; they dissociated themselves with the 
broadcasts of the night before and that Sharq Al-Adna [my italics] was no 
longer to be believed’ (Ferguson 1970: 267).
Ferguson was alerted first thing in the morning by monitors in London and 
had the entire staff arrested, including Poston who, according to Kamel 
Qustandi, had suggested that the staff resign, saying he no longer 
recognised his own country(Al Muqaddam 2015). 
Conclusion
It is tempting, especially if one concentrates on the station’s demise, to 
say the career of Sharq Al-Adna was a failure. Certainly, James Vaughan 
views the propaganda efforts of both the British and the Americans to 
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have failed, as ‘Western prestige and popularity in the Middle East 
declined precipitously’ after WW2. The technical operations of both 
countries’ information work was sophisticated and effective; the problem 
was the message. There was too much concentration on Cold War 
preoccupations and too little attention paid to Arab nationalism and to the 
question of Palestine and the Palestinians (Vaughan 2005: 238-249). Of 
Sharq, one might argue that the reasons for its existence in the precarious 
days of 1941 were never tested. The Arabs never had to choose between 
the British, the Germans, or the Italians. The fighting decided that. The 
station had then to reinvent itself to take account of the unmitigated 
disaster which the founding of the state of Israel represented to its 
audience, at the same time as reflecting, as subtly as it could, the 
changing policies of its hidden controllers. It also had to negotiate a path 
through the minefield of increasingly fraught Anglo-Egyptian relations, 
which finally proved too much. The carefully constructed edifice collapsed 
under the weight of its own internal contradictions—the British were no 
longer prepared to compromise the message in furtherance of their 
immediate political and military interests—the mailed fist of anti-Nasser 
propaganda instead of the velvet glove, of near-invisible persuasion 
wrapped in music, poetry and readings from the Koran. The staff, as 
predicted from the start, though prepared to work for one of the colonial 
powers, would not countenance being tools of their own oppression. In 
this refusal, they had the support of their British boss. 
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One could further state that Sharq’s greatest achievements had little 
connection to the aims and objectives of the station’s controllers but 
arose out of the means they chose to employ: the creation of an Arab 
language radio station, which broadcast Arab music, history, culture, 
religion and discourse.  Sharq was largely successful for most of its career 
in masking who controlled it, but to what precise effect is hard to say. It 
might be tautologous but the results of subtle propaganda would be by 
definition subtle. But Sharq al-Adna was one of the most popular radio 
stations in the Middle East for fifteen crucial years, launched or 
popularised the careers of musicians, singers, writers, directors and 
producers. It was a vehicle for Arab culture and a platform for diverse 
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